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At the end of the 20th century the SE European region was surviving one of the most difficult 
periods of changing hegemony and dominance circumstances. The disintegration of the communist 
world and the collapse of former Yugoslavia, as part of the process, could be considered as the result 
of the new relations among big powers’ hegemonic systems. The NATO spreads to the European 
east (Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland etc.), which has direct influence on SE Europe. After new 
countries (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia) had been internationally 
recognised in 1992, and the loyal Slovenian and Croatian partnership with NATO in the Kosovo 
action in 1999 was proved, it is obvious that regional hegemony of the Serbia core region does not 
exist any more. Also Russian (former Soviet) attempts to play the role of the dominant leader in this 
region have been suppressed to a minimum. The author discusses European Union interests in this 
zone, and the way European countries include themselves in the process of pacifying and 
developing the region. After Slovenia joined the European Union in 2004, Bulgaria, Romania, and 
Croatia are expected to satisfy the conditions for entering EU in next 3 to five years. In the same 
time Serbia and Montenegro enters a new, more democratic phase of its development. 
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Krajem 20. stoljeća prostor jugoistočne Europe preživljavao je jedno od najtežih razdoblja 
smjene regionalnih odnosa hegemonije i dominacije. Raspad komunističkog svijeta i kolaps bivše 
Jugoslavije, kao dio tog procesa, može se smatrati rezultatom novih odnosa među sustavima 
prevlasti velikih sila. NATO se širi prema europskom istoku (Mađarska, Češka, Poljska i dr.), što se 
razumljivo, odražava na izravne utjecaje u JI Europi. Nakon što su nove države bile međunarodno 
priznate 1992. (Slovenija, Hrvatska, Bosna i Hercegovina, Bivša Republika Makedonija), a 
Slovenija i Hrvatska iskazale lojalnost kao partneri NATO-a u akciji na Kosovu, jasno je da 
regionalna hegemonija srpskog središnjeg prostora više ne postoji. Ujedno, ruska (nekadašnja 
sovjetska) nastojanja da igraju ulogu vodećeg lidera u ovoj regiji, smanjena su na najmanju mjeru. 
Autor razmatra interese Europske Unije u ovoj zoni i način na koji se europske zemlje uključuju u 
proces pacificiranja i razvoja regije. Nakon što je Slovenija pristupila u Europsku uniju 2004., 
očekuje se da i Rumunjska, Bugarska i Hrvatska zadovolje uvjete ulaska u EU u sljedećih 3-5 
godina. Istodobno Srbija i Crna Gora ulaze u novu, demokratskiju fazu razvoja. 
Ključne riječi: JI Europa, hegemonija, centralitet, ratne akcije u JI Europi 






 The geo-strategic situation in the SE European region, which at the end of the 
20th century survived one of the most difficult periods of geopolitical changes, has not 
been adequately presented in the scientific literature as yet. Some recent interpretations of 
the strategic situation in the Mediterranean and Adriatic area appeared in the eighties and 
nineties (BERTINI, 1985, AMIN, 1992, COUTAU-BEGARIE, LABAULT, 1995, ROGIĆ 1993-
1994, SANGUIN, 1997, MAGAŠ, 2000), some works discussed agression in Croatia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (CRKVENČIĆ, 1993-1994, FOUCHER, 1993-1994, JORDAN, 1993-
1994, KLEMENČIĆ, 1993, 1993-1994), or the complex geopolitical frame of SE 
Europe/Balkans (PREVELAKIS, 1994), as well as Central Europe (RUPPERT, 1994) lately 
influenced by widening of NATO (MAGAŠ, 2003). The new geopolitical circumstances in 
the region, after wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina finished and the Kosovo 
crisis pacified, enabled the end of traditional hegemony in SE Europe manifested by the 
central role of Serbia in the frame of former Yugoslavia. The new era dominated by 
NATO and economic and political role of European Union in this part of Europe, already 
started showing all possibilities of more democratised multilateral rise as well as 
economic coexistence and development. The disintegration of the communist world and 
the collapse of former Yugoslavia, as part of the process, could be considered as the result 
of the new relations among big powers’ hegemonic systems. The NATO spreads to the 
east (Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland etc.), and of course it has concrete influences on 
SE Europe. After new countries had been recognised in 1992 (KLEMENČIĆ, 1993, 1993-
1994) and the loyal Slovenian and Croatian and Bosnian and Herzegovinian partnership 
with NATO in the Kosovo action in 1999 was proved, it is obvious that regional 
hegemony of Serbia does not exist any more. Also the Russian (former Soviet) attempts 




Fig. 1 South-east European countries in relation to the European Union in 2004 
Sl. 1. Zemlje jugoistočne Europe u odnosu na status prema Europskoj uniji, 2004. 




The disintegration of the communist world and the crisis in SE Europe after 1990. 
 
The first signs of crisis at the end of the 20th century when the SE European 
region survived one of the most difficult periods of changing the polarity and hegemonic 
circumstances showed in Romania in 1989, when the president Ceaucescu’s communist 
dictatorship ended as a consequence of street riots and conflicts, which fortunately did not 
take a long time. Also the political changes in Albania from 1990, manifested through 
instability and insecurity as the results of the collapse of communist government, the fall 
of new government and plenty of other internal events. The disintegration of former 
Yugoslavia (1991-1992), the constitution of new countries in the war circumstances (the 
short war in Slovenia in July 1991, in Croatia: August 1991 - August 1995, in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 1992-1995, the Kosovo crisis 1988-1999 with the final war actions in 1999, 
NATO actions in Kosovo and Serbia 1999, Montenegro crisis 1999-2000 and Albania 
1998-1999) show that the last decade of the 20th century was generally one of the most 
difficult periods of the region. The hegemony circumstances, which stabilised in the 
region after the fifties (Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria - members of the communist 
block dominated by USSR, Greece in the NATO block dominated by USA, Albania as 
the communist country connected mostly with China, Yugoslavia, non-aligned 
communist country standing as the buffer zone between West and East blocks), changed 
step by step (PREVELAKIS, 1994). After ten years of crises and wars, NATO became the 
dominant power in the zone (MAGAŠ, 2003).  
 The disintegration of the communist world and the collapse of former 
Yugoslavia, as part of the process (CRKVENČIĆ, 1993-1994, FOUCHER, 1993-1994, 
KLEMENČIĆ, 1993, 1993-1994), could be considered as the result of the new relations 
among big powers’ hegemonic systems. Especially, the collapse of former Yugoslavia 
shows how complex and delicate the geopolitical situation in SE Europe has been, and 
how catastrophic the consequences could have been (DOMAZET, 2002). Which were the 
main causes of that collapse? 
 Regional and supraregional causes: 
 1) The fall of the communism and the Warsaw Pact, as the result of the conflict 
between "East" and "West" in which the NATO block became more prestigious thanks to 
new technologies, more effective economy and geopolitical superiority. 
 2) The disintegration of multiethnic federations (Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, 
Yugoslavia), which were based on more hegemony of the dominant nations (PEPEONIK, 
1991) than it was the case on the West. 
 3) The interest of the NATO, the strongest dominant power, as well as that of 
western economic groups in spreading towards East (soon integrating Hungary, Poland 
and Czech Republic into NATO and constitution of Partnership for Peace group of 
nations) 
 4) The interests of Russia to pact with (or to protect) Serbia, in order to insure 
the approach to the Adriatic Sea zone, as the last attempt to preserve as strongest possible 
influence in the SE European countries.  
 Local causes: 
 1) The hegemonic position and the attempt of the Serbian regime (ROGIĆ 1993-
1994) to establish a new communist Yugoslavia or "Greater Serbia", conquering 
neighbouring lands. 




 2) The communist regime which neglected or tolerated the strongest nationalism 
(Serbian) in former Yugoslavia ("Serboslavia") using the force (Yugoslav National Army, 
YNA) against other federal republics (Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) and 
the autonomous province of Kosovo as well, kicking against the democratic changes. 
 3) Activities of smaller nationalist and separatist groups (Slovenia, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Kosovo),  
 4) More declarative but not really effective treatment of ethnic diversity 
problems connected with economic underdevelopment and intolerance during the 
Kingdom and the Socialist Yugoslavia periods, etc. 
 
 Quite expectedly, Greece, Turkey and Italy, as the members of the NATO pact, 
played a role of secure and stable zones and were not involved in the crisis. It is obvious 
that also Bulgaria and Macedonia avoided more serious conflicts. Slovenia, as the most 
western periphery of the crisis zone, escaped more serious events, too. Very effective 
engagement of the USA forces enabled Macedonia, former part of SFR Yugoslavia, to be 
recognised by the international community in spite of the problems with Greece, and to 
keep independence. The most brutal and cruel wars happened in Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and later in Kosovo (DOMAZET, 2002). Many facts show that dominant 
powers of the world, especially USA, had a good opportunity and possibility of stopping 
the war in time. Why was it effectively done in Kosovo later (1999), and was not in 
Croatia in 1991 or in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992? Obviously it was not possible as 
long as Serbia was not military and economically exhausted. 
 NATO spreads to the east (Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, etc.), and of 
course it has concrete influence on SE Europe. After fifteen years of cruelties and 
terrorisation in Kosovo, when Serbia started ethnic cleansing of Albanians in Kosovo in 
1999, NATO started one of the greatest actions in Europe after WW II. New members of 
NATO, especially neighbouring Hungary, as well as the air bases in Italy (Aviano, etc.) 
were included in the action. Because of the geopolitical position, the airspace of Croatia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Slovenia was also used for the air actions and air transport 
towards Serbia. Namely, after these three new countries had been recognised in 1992, the 
loyal Slovenian and Croatian partnership as well as the loyalty of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina were freely and voluntarily manifested in helping the NATO action 
(MAGAŠ, 2003). That was the result of the general international decision to stop Serbian 
violence in Kosovo, but also the expression of the need to punish the regime that started 
the war ravages and destruction in the three countries.  
 The other neighbouring countries, especially Macedonia and Albania suffered a 
lot during NATO actions, because of hundreds and hundreds thousand of refugees who 
were evacuated to their territories. The SE wing of NATO forces in Greece and Turkey 
was practically not involved in the action. A good cooperation was set up with Romania 
and Bulgaria, who also expect much closer relations with NATO in the near future. 
 After the success of the NATO action in Kosovo in 1999, it is obvious that 
regional hegemony of the Serbian core region does not exist any more. It seems that 
Slovenia, being included in Partnership for Peace since 1995, will become very soon the 
member of NATO. Croatia, after having consolidated its borders and proved loyalty to 
NATO, entered Partnership for Peace in 2001. Also Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is 
now within the international protection, is expected to enter the organisation in the near 
future. Benevolence and inclination of Romania, Bulgaria (in Partnership for Peace from 




1994), Albania and Macedonia (in Partnership for Peace from 1995) show that all these 
countries also tend to be a part of NATO. Finally it seems that at the end of the 20th 
century the whole SE Europe, as well as all Balkanic countries, except Serbia, show an 
interest to be included in the NATO membership. The older territorial division between 
Warsaw and NATO pacts (PREVELAKIS, 1994) with the former Yugoslav buffer zone, 
have disappeared. There is a chance that, after the processes of democratisation and 
recognition finish and borders stabilise, the entire region, as a part of NATO enters a new 
geopolitical future. 
 Russian (former Soviet) attempts to play the role of the dominant leader in this 
region have been suppressed to a minimum. Up to 2000, Russia lost its positions in 
Romania and Bulgaria, the former members of Eastern block. In the same time Russia 
explicitly expressed connections with Serbia. "Russia was sympathetic toward the Serbs, 
a traditional ally, and there was considerable Russian opposition to such policies as 
NATO's bombing of Serb positions, especially in 1999." (COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS., 
2003, U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, ) The intention to stop Serbian aggression in Croatia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, or in Kosovo was almost not shown. On the contrary, in many 
occasions Russia showed direct sympathy and loyalty to the Serbian interests. In spite of 
being so, the engagement of Russian forces in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and in 
Kosovo, finally was synchronised with the international actions (UNO, UNPROFOR, 
IFOR, NATO). Under such conditions, Russia could not engage deeper in the region. The 
situation in Russia (Chechen Republic, etc.), and some former Soviet countries 
suppressed any concrete action in SE Europe. 
 How did European Union interests appear in this zone, and how did European 
countries include themselves in the process of pacifying and developing the region? First 
big changes in local situation occurred in Romania. During the collapse of Ceaucescu’s 
regime, which was accompanied by bloody and tragic events, Europe showed a great 
interest in the peaceful solution of the crisis. Internal "revolution" finished with 
introducing a more liberal and democratic rule. Changes in Bulgaria and in Hungary, after 
the fall of Berlin Wall, were more democratic and under control. Europe supported new 
governments (RUPPERT, 1994). 
 In former Yugoslavia, changes started with bloody and tragic events. In the 
eighties, Serbian nationalist leaders (Milošević and others) started preparing for big 
changes (KLEMENČIĆ, 1993, 1993-1994). First they ensured military core to be more 
Serbian than federal, and then they started provoking problems in Kosovo. Thousands of 
Albanians were imprisoned and many of them killed. As it was not possible to stop 
Serbian nationalistic movement, which was spreading towards Kosovo, Montenegro, 
Vojvodina, and later in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and when Serbian communist leaders 
did not accept new democratic chances, the most developed republics, Slovenia and 
Croatia, organized democratic elections. After Croatia had elected new government, 
Serbian minority in Croatia and even Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina started fights 
against Croatian people. Europe did not show much interest in the problem of ethnic 
cleansing and mass murders of Croats in 1990 and in the first part of 1991, until military 
and paramilitary actions reached catastrophic dimensions in autumn 1991. Croatia and 
Slovenia were practically forced to proclaim independence in spring 1991. Yugoslav 
National Army started war actions in Slovenia, which lasted only a few days (July 1991). 
The Army soon moved to Croatia. European and American governments gave some free 
time (by September 1991) to the leaders of the region to settle down the crisis 




(CRKVENČIĆ, 1993-1994, FOUCHER, 1993-1994, KLEMENČIĆ, 1993, 1993-1994). 
"Russian hard-liners, meanwhile, urged that Russia give priority to defying what they 
called a "Western drive for hegemony" over the former Yugoslavia and to otherwise 
protecting Russian and Serbian geopolitical interests. Hard-liners in Russia and Serbia 
espoused a so-called pan-Slavic solidarity that emphasizes ethnic, religious, and historical 
ties. Its adherents shared a frustration at diminished geopolitical dominance (in Serbia's 
case, the loss of influence over other parts of the former Yugoslavia, and in Russia's case 
the loss of control over the near abroad)." (U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 2003). 
 But, in summer 1991 war actions against Croatia started. Serbs supported by 
Yugoslav army occupied 26% of the territory of the Republic of Croatia by January 3, 
1992 (Sarajevo Peace Agreement). Many massacres happened, and 300.000 Croatians had 
to leave their homes. Osijek, Karlovac, Vinkovci, Dubrovnik, Zadar, Šibenik, Gospić and 
many other cities were under artillery and air attacks. Vukovar was almost totally 
destroyed (more than 10.000 killed), and even Zagreb, the capital of Croatia was attacked. 
The international community did not stop these events in time, as it was done in 
Macedonia where Serbian aggression was stopped in 1991 with the presence of 400 USA 
soldiers in Skopje. Besides, the embargo was introduced for the former Yugoslavia 
countries, so Croatian nation was condemned to capitulate in the aggression. But, helped 
by more than 3 million people in emigration (in Croatia there were 4,8 million people in 
1991), and finally, with the international engagement, the aggression was stopped at the 
beginning of 1992, after Croatia had been recognised as an independent country. By 1995 
Croatia succeeded in liberating all occupied territories. The last legitimate military actions 
"Flash" and "Storm" in 1995 were not supported by the international community, but it 
was the only way for Croatia to stop the incredible occupation and traffic disruption of the 
territory (DOMAZET, 2002). Now, almost fifteen years later, only few persons are accused 
by The Hague International Penal Court for the crimes they did in Croatia. Yet more than 
10.000 people live out of their homes. 
 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose constitutive nations are Bosnians (Moslems), 
Croatians and Serbs, Serbian war actions against Croatian people, as mentioned before, 
started in 1991 (Kupres zone in Western Bosnia, Ravno in Eastern Herzegovina etc.), but, 
as it was widely accepted by the World, the "real war" started in May 1992 when 
Bosnians were attacked by Serbs and Yugoslav Army. Serbs occupied 65% of the 
territory militarily attacking and often massacring people in many villages and cities. 
Many areas inhabited by Bosnians and Croatians were cleansed (entire Eastern Bosnia, 
Eastern Herzegovina, part of Posavina etc.). Europe and USA could not suppress the Serb 
actions. Even conflicts between Croatians and Bosnians started, and massacres were done 
on both sides (SANGUIN, 2001). The biggest front actions were undertaken by Serbs 
during the visit of the French president Mitterand to Belgrade in 1992, and the most 
merciless massacres were made in Srebrenica, Goražde and Žepa in 1994/5 in spite of the 
presence of the International Peace Forces. The action of Bosnian Croats in 1995, as well 
as Bosnian Army and US air force support, made possible the rebirth of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, because some occupied regions were liberated, which affected Serbian 
strategic position. It enabled the Dayton Peace Accord meeting in 1995. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was finally founded as the federation of two entities: "Republika Srpska", as 
Serbian republic with 49% of territory (!) and Bosnian Federation as the territory of the 
Bosnians and the Croatians covering only 51% of the country. Three constitutive 
nationalities Serbs, Bosnians and Croatians were recognised. The successful end of the 




crisis was enabled thanks to the neighbouring territory of Croatia, which was used for the 
international forces’ traffic. International forces entered the country, but five years later 
there were estimated only 78% of pre war Croatian people in Bosnia (many emigrated to 
Croatia or other countries), 112% of Bosnians (although some emigrated, many were 
killed, some immigrated from Sandjak and Serbia), and 102% Serbs (some emigrated to 
Serbia or other countries, some immigrated from Croatia organized by the Serbs 
defensive military action in 1995) (see: CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, 2003). 
 In Kosovo, after fifteen years of terrorising, the crisis reached its climax in 
spring 1999. After almost one million people had emigrated to Albania, Macedonia and 
other countries, NATO started military actions against Serbia. It enabled Albanians to 
return back to Kosovo after Serbian forces retired leaving thousands of Albanians killed. 
At the end of 1999, and beginning of 2000 local fights between Serbs and Albanians 
started in the northern part of Kosovo (Kosovska Mitrovica). Strong American, British, 
French, German and other NATO countries’ forces, as well as Russian forces keep the 
peace at present. In spite of that, radical nationalists provoke realising local terrorist 
actions from time to time. At the moment Serbia, after Milošević’s regime fell, still shows 
an expressed, long lasting resistance to international influence and actions. Serbia for a 
long time did not recognise the competence of the International War Crimes Tribunal in 
The Hague, and started to arrest persons accused for genocide and other crimes against 
humanity only after the collapse of Milošević’s regime. Finally he was sent to The Hague 
after more democratic government in Serbia appeared in 2001. In Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, more and more crimes of war have been recognised and prosecuted by law 
in The Hague or in the country.  
 A kind of disappointment arose among Croatians in Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and all over the world in 1999 and 2000, after processes against some 
Croatians, which lasted for three or four years, and sentences up to forty five years, 
although some of them have been lately repealed. Because of being the first object of 
aggression, the first obliged to emigrate and to show extreme resistance not to be cleansed 
and destroyed, Croatians consider their actions of defence completely legal. International 
isolation of Serbia, as a logic consequence of all the crimes committed by Milošević’s 
regime is to be compared with a practical isolation of Croatia, which lasted from 1995 to 
2000. Was Croatia, the attacked side, the victim of the war, condemned to suffer the war 
consequences? In the first place it was attacked and partly occupied, but got no 
effective/legal military help from any country. On the contrary, weapon import embargo 
laid on the whole region almost led up to Serbian triumph. The main accusations against 
Croatia were explained by "cooperation in dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina", and by "no 
cooperation with The Hague Tribunal."  
 The events in 1999 and 2000 show that, after the NATO action in Kosovo and 
Serbia had successfully put an end to military and paramilitary actions, to cleansing and 
massacring, the new possibilities of strategic reorganisation in SE Europe were opened. 
The United Nations started administering Kosovo, and almost all refugees returned. 
Under the patronage of EU countries and NATO, in 1999 a new agreement, the Stability 
Pact, was established. It included countries of the region except Serbia and Montenegro, 
not only Balkans core countries, but Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary and Romania, too. In the 
same year Hungary, as well as Czech Republic and Poland entered NATO. Grouping the 
lands, which have recently been collaborating with NATO, the Stability Pact, as a quite 




new regional organisation, seems to open new ways of security, economic, military and 
other cooperations and coordinations among the countries.  
 After the situation in Kosovo stabilised, and after Croatia changed its 
government in third free elections, the circumstances opened new chances. The social-
democrats in Croatia managed in political fight to obtain the rule in the country, which 
was well accepted in Europe, USA and neighbouring countries, especially in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. In the period 2000-2005 Croatia made a strong effort to be accepted as a 
partner in negotiations for approaching EU. Some smaller problems of defining 
borderlines with Slovenia (GOSAR, KLEMENČIĆ, 2000) and other neighbouring countries 
should not play a serious role in the process of satisfying EU criteria. 
 The main problem in the region, the Serbian non-democratic regime, which 
successfully persisted a whole decade in spite of economic and strategic embargo and 
isolation, seems finally to be disappearing. The main task of western countries to change 
the government in Yugoslavia (today Serbia and Montenegro) was successfully realised, 
but after last elections in 2005, there are signs that radical nationalists still are very strong. 
The strong nationalist program, which had united great deal of Serbs in former 
Yugoslavia (the idea of Greater Serbia, the thesis that all south Slaves except Slovenians 
and Bulgarians are Serbs or should be assimilated, proclaiming that Serbia must be 
everywhere some Serbs live etc.), although recently radically modified, unites even now 
many local forces of the country (some parties, many nationalists in government, army, 
police etc.).  
 In 1999, some new problems arose in Montenegro, too. The pressure and non-
democratic rule of the new Yugoslav federal government initiated ideas of separation of 
this federal republic (once being independent kingdom). The question was whether this 
could result in a direct military action of Federal Army in Montenegro. Quite a serious 
engagement of Montenegro in Stability Pact as well as the interest of European Union, 
USA and NATO in the Montenegrin problems obstructed the possibility of Milošević’s 
direct military action, and after his fall it was almost quite excluded. Although 
international community does not support Montenegro as another new independent 
Balkan state, there are still opened possibilities of dividing it from the Federation of 





The conclusion of discussing main strategic elements dealing with SE Europe 
and hegemony and dominance in the region could be synthesised in several theses: 
 - The disruption of Eastern Block caused political and economic changes in SE 
Europe, even the collapse of former Yugoslavia, with excessively cruel military 
engagements in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. 
 - After the consolidation of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995) and Kosovo 
(1999), and after the fall of Milošević’s regime in 2001, situation is pacified, but there is 
still the problem of Kosovo that obviously results finally in the strong autonomy, as well 
as the question of Montenegro separation.  
 - The former "neutral" position of Tito’s Yugoslavia (the leader of non-aligned 
countries), and the division of interests between two blocks (NATO with Greece and 
Turkey, Warsaw Pact with Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria), changed into the new 




strategic relationship. NATO spread towards east (Hungary, Partnership for Peace: 
Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Albania), and became the most 
powerful force and the factor of the strongest influence in the region. 
 - This shows a new strategic relationship in centrality and hegemony in the 
region. All countries collaborate more or less with NATO and Western countries, except 
Serbia, which shows their interest in being accepted by more democratic and more 
developed world of the international community at the beginning of the 21st century. 
 - When expected process of democratic changes in Serbia, connected with the 
fall of its dictatorial regime, reach a needed level and pacification of the region 
completes, Stability Pact program, initiated by western countries and NATO, could give 
first results in stabilising economic and political situation of the region. There is a hope 
that no more military actions are to precede new process of multilateral cooperation and 
development, as well as multilateral coexistence, which will enable entering of all SE 
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 D. Magaš: Kraj hegemonije i dominacije u Jugoistočnoj Europi 
 
 Jugoistočna Europa, posebice prostor bivše Jugoslavije, pokazala se nakon raspada 
Varšavskog pakta i komunističkog sustava krajem osamdesetih godina 20. st. najosjetljivijim i 
najranjivijim dijelom kontinenta. Naime u posljednjem desetljeću 20. stoljeća prostor jugoistočne 
Europe preživljavao je jedno od najtežih razdoblja smjene regionalnih odnosa hegemonije i 
dominacije koji su eskalirali do ratnih razmjera. Raspad komunističkog svijeta i kolaps bivše 
Jugoslavije, kao dio globalnog procesa definiranja nove geostrateške ravnoteže može se smatrati 
rezultatom novih odnosa među sustavima prevlasti velikih sila. NATO se širi prema europskom 
istoku novim stalnim članicama (Mađarska, Češka, Poljska) kao i stvaranjem posebne zajednice 
zemalja Partnerstva za mir, što se, razumljivo, odražava na izravne utjecaje u JI Europi. Nakon što 
su nove države bile međunarodno priznate 1992. (Slovenija, Hrvatska, Bosna i Hercegovina, 
Makedonija), a Slovenija i Hrvatska iskazale lojalnost kao partneri NATO-a u akciji na Kosovu, 
jasno je da regionalna hegemonija srpskog središnjeg prostora više ne postoji. Vojna srpska agresija 
u Hrvatskoj nije uspjela, u Bosni i Hercegovini rezultirala je jakom autonomijom Republike Srpske 
na oko polovici teritorija zemlje, a akcije na Kosovu provocirale su snažnu međunarodnu vojnu 
intervenciju protiv Srbije. Ujedno, ruska (nekadašnja sovjetska) nastojanja da igraju ulogu vodećeg 
lidera u ovoj regiji, bitno su smanjena, uz nastojanja da se sa svim zemljama zadrže što je moguće 
bolji bilateralni odnosi. Autor razmatra interese Europske Unije u ovoj zoni i način na koji su se 
europske zemlje uključile u proces pacificiranja i budućeg razvoja regije. Nakon što je Slovenija, 
poput susjedne Mađarske, s još 8 zemalja pristupila u Europsku uniju 2004., očekuje se da i 
Rumunjska, Bugarska i Hrvatska, nakon započetih intenzivnih razgovora kao prihvaćenih 
kandidata, zadovolje uvjete ulaska u EU u sljedećih 3-5 godina. Istodobno Srbija i Crna Gora ulaze 
u novu, demokratskiju fazu razvoja, ali ostaje otvoreno pitanje mogućeg osamostaljenja Crne Gore 
kao i jasnije definiranje prostora Kosova. 
 
